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Bertrand–Edgeworth Model

The Bertrand–Edgeworth model is an oligopoly pricing model in which firms compete in prices while facing fixed production capacity constraints, resolving the Bertrand paradox and generating mixed-strategy price dispersion.

The Bertrand–Edgeworth model (originating with Joseph Bertrand's 1883 critique of Cournot and Francis Ysidro Edgeworth's 1897 capacity-constrained extension) analyzes price competition among oligopolistic firms producing a homogeneous good when each firm faces a binding capacity constraint. In the unconstrained Bertrand duopoly, two symmetric firms with constant marginal cost c undercut each other until price collapses to marginal cost (p = c) and economic profits vanish—the classic Bertrand paradox.

Edgeworth demonstrated that once firms cannot supply the entire market demand at marginal cost (ki < D(c)), marginal-cost pricing ceases to be a Nash equilibrium. Any firm facing a capacity-constrained rival can raise its price above c and profitably serve the residual demand left unsatisfied by its rival, restoring positive markups and price dispersion.

Residual Demand and Rationing Rules

When firm 1 sets a lower price p1 < p2 and sells up to its capacity k1, consumers who wish to buy at p1 exceed k1, so some buyers must be rationed and turn to the higher-priced firm 2. The shape of firm 2's residual demand D2(p2; p1) depends on the rationing rule:

  1. Efficient (parallel) rationing: Buyers with the highest willingness to pay are served first by the low-price firm, leaving residual demand D2(p2) = max{0, D(p2) − k1}. This maximizes total consumer surplus and typically yields the sharpest equilibrium bounds.
  2. Proportional (random) rationing: All buyers willing to pay p1 have equal probability k1 / D(p1) of being served by firm 1, leaving residual demand D2(p2) = D(p2) [1 − k1 / D(p1)].
Capacity Regime (Symmetric Duopoly, k1 = k2 = k)Pure-Strategy Equilibrium?Equilibrium Price OutcomeEconomic Profit
Abundant Capacity (k ≥ D(c))Yes (p1 = p2 = c)Bertrand marginal-cost pricingZero profit
Tight Capacity (k ≤ D(pC) / 2, Cournot-level)Yes (market-clearing price)Firms price so D(p) = 2kPositive scarcity rents
Intermediate Capacity (D(pC) / 2 < k < D(c))No pure-strategy equilibriumMixed-strategy price dispersion over [pmin, pmax]Strictly positive expected profit

Edgeworth Price Cycles and Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium

In the intermediate capacity regime, no pair of fixed prices (p1, p2) is mutually best-responding. If both firms set a low price, one firm can jump up to its monopoly price on the residual demand curve; if both set a high price, each has an incentive to undercut by a penny to capture full capacity k.

In a one-shot game, this tension resolves into a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium characterized by a continuous, atomless cumulative price distribution F(p) over an interval [pmin, pmax] above marginal cost. In dynamic or repeated settings with staggered price adjustments, the same undercutting-and-relenting logic produces Edgeworth price cycles: asymmetric sawtooth price paths characterized by gradual downward undercutting followed by sudden upward price jumps—a pattern widely documented empirically in retail gasoline and seasonal airline pricing.

Connection to Cournot Competition

In a seminal two-stage extension, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) showed that when firms first choose capacities (k1, k2) simultaneously and then compete in Bertrand–Edgeworth prices under efficient rationing, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium yields Cournot quantities and Cournot prices. This result unified quantity and price competition by showing that Cournot outcomes naturally emerge as reduced-form equilibria of capacity-constrained price competition.

However, subsequent research demonstrated that this equivalence depends sensitively on the rationing rule and demand curvature: under proportional rationing, firms may choose different pre-commitment capacities or sustain asymmetric mixed-strategy pricing even in the first stage. In seasonal industries such as airlines, hotels, and electricity markets, where marginal costs are low and short-run capacity is fixed, Bertrand–Edgeworth dynamics explain why prices fluctuate sharply over the booking horizon as remaining capacity tightens relative to residual demand.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why does no pure-strategy equilibrium exist for intermediate capacities in the Bertrand–Edgeworth model? At low prices, a firm prefers to raise its price and earn high margins on the rival's leftover residual demand; at high prices, a firm prefers to undercut slightly to sell out its entire capacity, creating an endless cycle unless firms randomize prices.

What is an Edgeworth price cycle? An Edgeworth price cycle is a dynamic pricing pattern where firms repeatedly undercut each other down toward cost until profits become too small, at which point one firm jumps prices back up and the undercutting cycle restarts.

How does the model resolve the Bertrand paradox? By introducing realistic production capacity limits, firms can no longer capture the entire market by cutting price to marginal cost, allowing positive profits and above-cost pricing even with homogeneous goods.

References

  1. Fadavi, N. (2024). Dynamic Price Dispersion of Seasonal Goods in Bertrand–Edgeworth Competition. Applied Economics and Finance. https://doi.org/10.11114/aef.v11i2.6898
  2. Vetter, H. (2012). Endogenous Competition: Environmental Taxes in Edgeworth-Bertrand Duopoly. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2174883
  3. Betancourt, J., et al. (2024). Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints. https://doi.org/10.3386/w32673
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