Cournot Duopoly Model
The Cournot duopoly model is an oligopoly framework where competing firms simultaneously choose output quantities, determining equilibrium prices and profits that sit between monopoly and perfect competition.
The Cournot duopoly model is a foundational mathematical model of imperfect competition formulated by French mathematician and economist Antoine Augustin Cournot in 1838 in Recherches sur les principes mathรฉmatiques de la thรฉorie des richesses. Cournot investigated how independent, profit-maximizing producers behave in a concentrated market where each firm's output decision directly alters the market price received by all competitors.
The Cournot framework introduced the concept of the reaction function (best-response mapping) and solved for a stable non-cooperative market outcomeโanticipating John Nash's concept of Nash equilibrium by more than a century.
Market Structure and the Best-Response Mapping
Consider an industry consisting of two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, producing a homogeneous, perfectly substitutable good. Each firm chooses its output quantity q1 and q2 simultaneously and independently. Total industry output is Q = q1 + q2.
Market price is determined by the inverse market demand function:
P(Q) = a โ b Q = a โ b (q1 + q2)
where a > 0 represents the choke price and b > 0 is the demand slope.
Both firms operate with identical constant marginal cost c > 0 and zero fixed costs (a > c):
Ci(qi) = c qi, i โ {1, 2}
Firm 1 maximizes total profit ฯ1 taking Firm 2's output q2 as given:
ฯ1(q1, q2) = [ a โ b (q1 + q2) โ c ] q1
Setting the first-order condition with respect to q1 to zero:
โฯ1 / โq1 = a โ 2 b q1 โ b q2 โ c = 0
Solving for q1 yields Firm 1's best-response function (or reaction curve) R1(q2):
q1 = R1(q2) = (a โ c โ b q2) / (2 b)
By symmetry, Firm 2's best-response function is:
q2 = R2(q1) = (a โ c โ b q1) / (2 b)
The slope of each reaction function is negative (dqi / dqj = โยฝ), indicating that output quantities are strategic substitutes: when a rival increases its production, the firm's optimal response is to scale back its own output to defend market prices.
Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Industry Profits
The CournotโNash equilibrium (q1*, q2*) occurs at the simultaneous intersection of both best-response curves. Substituting q2* into R1:
q1* = [ a โ c โ b ( (a โ c โ b q1*) / 2 b ) ] / (2 b)
Solving for q1* and q2*:
q1* = q2* = (a โ c) / (3 b)
Total market output *Q** is:
*Q** = q1* + q2* = 2 (a โ c) / (3 b)
The resulting equilibrium market price *P** is:
*P** = a โ b *Q** = a โ 2/3 (a โ c) = โ a + โ c
Each firm earns equilibrium economic profit:
ฯi* = (*P** โ c) qi* = [ (a โ c) / 3 ] [ (a โ c) / (3 b) ] = (a โ c)2 / (9 b)
Comparative Welfare Analysis
Comparing the Cournot duopoly outcome against monopoly and perfect competition reveals its intermediate position:
| Market Structure | Total Output (Q) | Market Price (P) | Total Consumer Surplus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monopoly | ยฝ (a โ c) / b | ยฝ (a + c) | โ (a โ c)2 / b |
| Cournot Duopoly | โ (a โ c) / b | โ a + โ c | 2/9 (a โ c)2 / b |
| Perfect Competition | (a โ c) / b | c | ยฝ (a โ c)2 / b |
Output under Cournot competition is strictly higher than under monopoly, but strictly lower than the socially optimal competitive level, generating deadweight loss.
N-Firm Extension and Convergence to Perfect Competition
Extending the Cournot model to N identical firms demonstrates that market concentration governs competitive efficiency:
qi* = (a โ c) / [ (N + 1) b ], *Q** = [ N / (N + 1) ] [ (a โ c) / b ]
*P** = [ 1 / (N + 1) ] a + [ N / (N + 1) ] c
As the number of firms N approaches infinity (limNโโ):
limNโโ *Q** = (a โ c) / b, limNโโ *P** = c
William Novshek proved that under general non-linear cost and demand structures, the Cournot equilibrium smoothly converges to the Walrasian competitive equilibrium as the number of competitors grows, providing a rigorous microeconomic bridge between game-theoretic oligopoly and neoclassical general equilibrium.
References
- Novshek, W. (1980). "Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry." The Review of Economic Studies, 47(3), 473โ486. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297299
- Kreps, D. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1983). "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes." The Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 326โ337. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003636
- Roberts, J., & Sonnenschein, H. (1977). On the existence of Cournot equilibrium without concave profit functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 14(1), 112-121. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90028-x90028-x)