โ† Wiki Index / Business & Economics Theory / Cournot Duopoly Model
๐Ÿ“ˆ Business & Economics Theory

Cournot Duopoly Model

The Cournot duopoly model is an oligopoly framework where competing firms simultaneously choose output quantities, determining equilibrium prices and profits that sit between monopoly and perfect competition.

The Cournot duopoly model is a foundational mathematical model of imperfect competition formulated by French mathematician and economist Antoine Augustin Cournot in 1838 in Recherches sur les principes mathรฉmatiques de la thรฉorie des richesses. Cournot investigated how independent, profit-maximizing producers behave in a concentrated market where each firm's output decision directly alters the market price received by all competitors.

The Cournot framework introduced the concept of the reaction function (best-response mapping) and solved for a stable non-cooperative market outcomeโ€”anticipating John Nash's concept of Nash equilibrium by more than a century.

Market Structure and the Best-Response Mapping

Consider an industry consisting of two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, producing a homogeneous, perfectly substitutable good. Each firm chooses its output quantity q1 and q2 simultaneously and independently. Total industry output is Q = q1 + q2.

Market price is determined by the inverse market demand function:

P(Q) = a โˆ’ b Q = a โˆ’ b (q1 + q2)

where a > 0 represents the choke price and b > 0 is the demand slope.

Both firms operate with identical constant marginal cost c > 0 and zero fixed costs (a > c):

Ci(qi) = c qi, i โˆˆ {1, 2}

Firm 1 maximizes total profit ฯ€1 taking Firm 2's output q2 as given:

ฯ€1(q1, q2) = [ a โˆ’ b (q1 + q2) โˆ’ c ] q1

Setting the first-order condition with respect to q1 to zero:

โˆ‚ฯ€1 / โˆ‚q1 = a โˆ’ 2 b q1 โˆ’ b q2 โˆ’ c = 0

Solving for q1 yields Firm 1's best-response function (or reaction curve) R1(q2):

q1 = R1(q2) = (a โˆ’ c โˆ’ b q2) / (2 b)

By symmetry, Firm 2's best-response function is:

q2 = R2(q1) = (a โˆ’ c โˆ’ b q1) / (2 b)

The slope of each reaction function is negative (dqi / dqj = โˆ’ยฝ), indicating that output quantities are strategic substitutes: when a rival increases its production, the firm's optimal response is to scale back its own output to defend market prices.

Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Industry Profits

The Cournotโ€“Nash equilibrium (q1*, q2*) occurs at the simultaneous intersection of both best-response curves. Substituting q2* into R1:

q1* = [ a โˆ’ c โˆ’ b ( (a โˆ’ c โˆ’ b q1*) / 2 b ) ] / (2 b)

Solving for q1* and q2*:

q1* = q2* = (a โˆ’ c) / (3 b)

Total market output *Q** is:

*Q** = q1* + q2* = 2 (a โˆ’ c) / (3 b)

The resulting equilibrium market price *P** is:

*P** = a โˆ’ b *Q** = a โˆ’ 2/3 (a โˆ’ c) = โ…“ a + โ…” c

Each firm earns equilibrium economic profit:

ฯ€i* = (*P** โˆ’ c) qi* = [ (a โˆ’ c) / 3 ] [ (a โˆ’ c) / (3 b) ] = (a โˆ’ c)2 / (9 b)

Comparative Welfare Analysis

Comparing the Cournot duopoly outcome against monopoly and perfect competition reveals its intermediate position:

Market StructureTotal Output (Q)Market Price (P)Total Consumer Surplus
Monopolyยฝ (a โˆ’ c) / bยฝ (a + c)โ…› (a โˆ’ c)2 / b
Cournot Duopolyโ…” (a โˆ’ c) / bโ…“ a + โ…” c2/9 (a โˆ’ c)2 / b
Perfect Competition(a โˆ’ c) / bcยฝ (a โˆ’ c)2 / b

Output under Cournot competition is strictly higher than under monopoly, but strictly lower than the socially optimal competitive level, generating deadweight loss.

N-Firm Extension and Convergence to Perfect Competition

Extending the Cournot model to N identical firms demonstrates that market concentration governs competitive efficiency:

qi* = (a โˆ’ c) / [ (N + 1) b ], *Q** = [ N / (N + 1) ] [ (a โˆ’ c) / b ]

*P** = [ 1 / (N + 1) ] a + [ N / (N + 1) ] c

As the number of firms N approaches infinity (limNโ†’โˆž):

limNโ†’โˆž *Q** = (a โˆ’ c) / b, limNโ†’โˆž *P** = c

William Novshek proved that under general non-linear cost and demand structures, the Cournot equilibrium smoothly converges to the Walrasian competitive equilibrium as the number of competitors grows, providing a rigorous microeconomic bridge between game-theoretic oligopoly and neoclassical general equilibrium.

References

  1. Novshek, W. (1980). "Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry." The Review of Economic Studies, 47(3), 473โ€“486. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297299
  2. Kreps, D. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1983). "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes." The Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 326โ€“337. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003636
  3. Roberts, J., & Sonnenschein, H. (1977). On the existence of Cournot equilibrium without concave profit functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 14(1), 112-121. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90028-x90028-x)
๐Ÿงฌ Support Open Science
Explore interactive science games on LowKey Games or browse scientific apparel & accessories in the CRV Science Shop.
๐Ÿ’ก Spot an inaccuracy or have primary literature to expand this article?
Submit a citation or revision note using your shared CRV Science / LowKey Games profile ID.
Suggest Revision